








Go Divisive or Not? 







CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3298 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Go Divisive or Not? 





This paper studies how political competition can lead candidates to strategically increase the 
salience of specific issues, in order to influence voting decisions of marginal groups, with non 
trivial consequences for turnout rates. In my setup issues differ in their divisiveness, to be 
defined as the extent to which members within a coalition disagree. Political candidates face a 
trade-off; they can choose to increase the salience of cohesive issues which energize their own 
(but also their opponent) constituency or divisive issues which alienate the opponent (but also 
their own) supporters. Using a model of probabilistic voting, I derive equilibrium campaign 
strategies of the candidates and predictions on turnout. The results are relevant for the 
literature on political participation, pointing out that it is crucial to analyze campaign effects 
on different groups of voters, to explain turnout rates actually observed. We also show 
descriptive evidence on US Presidential campaigns, supporting the model. 
JEL-Code: D72, D83. 
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"On the morning after election the country￿ s liberals were astonished to hear that, according
to exit polls, "moral values" outranked all other issues in determining voters￿choices. Later on
that same day, the reelected President Bush set out his legislative objectives for his second term.
Making America a more moral country was not a priority. His goals were mainly economic: he
would privatize Social Security and reform federal tax code....In o¢ cial Washington, the values
issues themselves seemed to dissipate like so much smoke once the elections were over. After all,
more important matters were beckoning...." (What￿ s the Matter with Kansas? by Thomas Frank,
2005)
1 Introduction
The content of political platforms plays an important role in dividing voters and determines the
relevant dimensions of con￿ ict in a society. There is an interesting pattern in politics showing
that campaigns which used to be dominated by socio-economic issues are now focusing also on
other issues, usually poorly correlated with the former, such as religion, moral values, abortion,
ethnicity or the environment. In modern societies individual preferences are highly di⁄erentiated
and the political con￿ ict might occur along several dimensions. The question we want to answer
is: which of these dimensions will be relevant in a political race? In other words, which topics will
be selected by a winning motivated candidate? This paper studies how under some circumstances,
political competition leads candidates to strategically increase the salience of speci￿c issues in order
to in￿ uence voting decisions of marginal groups, with non trivial consequences for turnout rates. In
particular we derive the conditions under which, perfect competition between politicians generates
in equilibrium asymmetric behavior, i.e. di⁄erent turnout rates for di⁄erent groups of voters. The
results are relevant for the literature on political participation and turnout, pointing out that it is
crucial to analyze campaign e⁄ects on di⁄erent groups of voters, to explain turnout rates actually
observed. The focus of the analysis is represented by particular groups of voters, namely con￿ icted
partisans who experience some disagreement with their candidate and typically make up their
minds in the last stage of campaigns. There is evidence on how undecided voters are particularly
subject to persuasion, similarly to the swing voters who "switch for some snotty little reason such
as not liking the candidate￿ s wife", as the spokesman for an American advertising agency said in
21952. As a special form of political persuasion we study the role of priming which consists in calling
the attention to some matters ignoring others; indeed in our setup the importance voters assign to
speci￿c issues depends on the amount of messages received on those issue during the campaign, and
individual voting decisions are based on the perceived salience of each issue in the platform. In the
last stage of an electoral campaign, candidates focus their e⁄orts on the disagreement groups within
coalitions, who untill close to election day are not to sure whether to cast their ballot or stay home.
These voters can be easily mobilized or disa⁄ected by candidates, making them to believe that the
issues primed are truly the most important in their political agendas. For example, if con￿ icted
partisans perceive an increase in the salience of the policy dimension on which they disagree, they
might decide to stay home, not supporting their candidate. As a consequence, given the distribution
of preferences in the population, candidates have the incentive to strategically "prime" certain issues
ignoring others. In this study we distinguish between cohesive and divisive issues; the former induce
disagreement only between coalitions, while the latter induce disagreement both between and within
coalitions. Candidates can a⁄ect issues￿salience in the electorate deciding the amount of campaign
resources to spend in advertising di⁄erent issues. Typically an increase in the salience of cohesive
issues energizes voters and increases turnout, while if divisive issues are perceived as relatively more
important, political disa⁄ection increases and voters tend to abstain. Since we are interested in
the last days of a campaign, when competition becomes sti⁄er, we exclude ￿rst best issues, the
ones which are cohesive for one coalition but divisive for the opponent; these issues are usually
raised at the very beginning since they generate a net electoral gain for one candidate. Instead
we focus on second best issues; the logic behind is that, once a candidate has raised any ￿rst best
issue and she is sure about the support of her party stronghold, she is left with two groups of
targetable voters, i.e. minorities ("con￿ icted" groups) within each constituency which agree with
their candidate on the cohesive issue but disagree on the divisive issue. Clearly political candidates
face a trade-o⁄; they can choose to increase the salience of cohesive issues, which activate their
own (but also their opponent) constituency, or divisive issues, which alienate the opponent (but
also their own) supporters. In other words a candidate can invest more campaign resources either
to increase participation among his own constituency (but also among the opponent￿ s one), or
to decrease the turnout among opponent￿ s constituency (but also among his own constituency).
Several elements might render the trade o⁄ less severe as the di⁄erence in groups￿responsiveness,
in candidates￿ability to campaign in favor of divisive relative to cohesive issues, or the presence of
informational barriers among voters due to new information technology and features of the media
3market. Using a probabilistic model of electoral competition, I pin down equilibrium campaign
strategies of the candidates and interestingly, I derive predictions on equilibrium turnout. First,
we show that, whenever one candidate is better able in campaigning divisive issues and she is
the candidate of the most partisan group, divisiveness of campaign increases and total turnout
decreases. Second, we ￿nd that generally the most responsive group is less likely to turnout,
which implies a higher political representation of partisans, with non trivial consequences during
the following legislature. Overall, the analysis helps to understand which dimensions of con￿ ict
emerge in political campaigns, and their e⁄ects on political participation of di⁄erent groups of
voters. This paper is linked to the literature on campaigns content and campaigns e⁄ects. There
is a large literature on campaigns content, developed by political scientists, psychologists and
experts in political communication. However these studies are often descriptive and lack theoretical
foundations. One branch of this literature extensively described the concept of issue ownership (see
Budge and Farlie (1983), Petrocik (1996), and Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994)), which has been
found to a⁄ect voting choice; according to this argument, political parties become closely associated
with certain issues in a way that citizens take as granted party￿ s competence in handling them.
Analyzing political campaigns, Petrocik suggests that the successful candidate will focus public
attention on issues that the candidate￿ s party has a better reputation for handling than the opposing
party. Petrocik argues that when a party is successful in moving its issues to the top of the agenda,
that party￿ s candidates bene￿t. Regarding the literature on the e⁄ecs of political campaigns, there
is a long lasting debate on whether campaigns do matter. Some (Campbell et al. (1960), Campbell
(2000), Gelman and King (1993)) have supported the "minimal e⁄ects" hypothesis according to
which voting behavior can be predicted well before the electoral period since voter preferences do
not change during campaign. Other studies (Shawn (1999), Gerber and Green (2000), Hylligus and
Jackman (2003), Hylligus (2005)) have found that campaigns in￿ uence voters preferences through
media coverage, advertising and grassroots mobilization. Some contributions have also looked at
media as agenda setter (see Denton for a review), analyzing their e⁄ect on individuals judgement
capacity, through persuasion, with a special focus on priming. Iyengar et al. actually ￿nd that in
this way, television news in￿ uences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and
candidates for public o¢ ce are judged. Politicians spend enormous amunt of money in advertising
and for teams of experts who design their campaigns taking into account how voters process political
messages (see Denton). Then it is important to study how these cognitive mechanisms a⁄ect the
presence of certain issues in political platforms. In line with this idea, Abramowitz (1985) noticed
4that the relation between politicians evaluations and voters choice in elections is a⁄ected by the
salience voters assign to the issues addressed by the candidates. In my framework candidates
try to precisely a⁄ect the salience of di⁄erent political matters by priming. The most related
contribution to the literature on campaigns content is the recent work by Hillygus and Shields
(2009). They provide a lot of descriptive evidence on the presence of wedge issues in presidential
campaigns, describing how the emergence of disagreement groups within coalitions gives candidates
the incentive to exploit an extensive margin. Using advanced methods of communication, politicians
seek to increase the salience of disagreement issues for these minority groups, trying to get them
on their side the day of the election. My attempt is to provide a systematic theoretical foundation
to their arguments although I focus on an intensive margin to be exploited by candidates, namely
the individual decision to participate and vote. This is very helpful in order to get empirical
predictions on candidates campaign strategies and turnout rates. Indeed the empirical evidence
on the e⁄ect of campaigns on turnout (Bergan et al. (2005), Gerber and Green (2000)) is not
conclusive and generally has found small e⁄ects. However, as suggested by Hylligus (2005), these
results might come from averaging out the e⁄ects on di⁄erent portions of the electorate. My results
on turnout precisely account for the e⁄ects of campaign activities on di⁄erent groups of voters.
Moreover we also study how the availability of new technologies can shape campaign content. The
mechanism of informational barriers among voters, I introduce in fourth section, vaguely resembles
the argument of Glaeser et al.(2005), however my study is di⁄erent in several respects; ￿rst, in
their model results come from the presence of informational barriers among voters, while in my
case the key driver of candidates strategies is the presence of disagreement groups within coalitions.
Indeed without informational barriers, Glaeser et al. obtain the standard median voter outcome,
explaining moderation in political agendas, while I get non trivial results on the type of issues in the
platforms and on turnout rates. Second, in Glaeser et al., political con￿ ict is unidimensional while
here is two dimensional; this allows me to explain the presence of both divisive and cohesive issues
in political campaigns, not only candidates￿political stance on a certain issue. Finally, in their
paper the asymmetry of information generates extremism in political platforms, while in my case,
it a⁄ects the amount of campaign expenditure used for "di⁄erential" priming, i.e. for targeting
di⁄erent types of issues to di⁄erent groups of voters. The paper continues as it follows; in the next
section I present the benchmark model, in third section I extend the model considering the concept
of issue ownership, fourth section allows for the presence of informational asymmetry, ￿fth section
provides descriptive evidence from 2004 US presidential elections, last section concludes.
52 The Basic Model
To introduce the model I present a piece of anecdotal evidence from Hillygus et al. (2009), to
show how the presence of disagreement groups within constituencies a⁄ect strategic motivations of
candidates in the design of campaigns. In 1976 the president Ford wrote a campaign strategy memo
on environmental policy. He was worried that conservationist voters living in the suburbs, perceived
him as an anti-environment candidate. Since these voters were leaning toward Republicans on other
issues, he was suggesting in the memo to "avoid allowing the environmental issue to become so
aggravated that environmentalists will vote against Ford on that issue alone. So wherever we can
responsibly lean toward them, it would be politically helpful". Using the logic of our model, the
strategy of president Ford would consist in trying to increase the relative salience of cohesive issues,
in order to get out the votes of weak republicans. More recently in 2004 US presidential campaign,
both candidates, Bush and Kerry, put a lot of e⁄ort to target conservative Democrats; the former
candidate priming moral issues, the latter priming education and employment. My framework will
provide a rationale to explain the observed pattern in 2004 campaign strategies, when Bush played
relatively more divisive than Kerry.
2.1 Voters Preferences
This probabilistic voting model is build on Persson and Tabellini (2000). Assume a population
divided in four groups: MR;MD;mR;mD, with measures ￿R;￿D;￿R;￿D respectively, and ￿R +
￿D+￿R+￿D = 1. No group represents the majority of the population, i.e. ￿R;￿D;￿R;￿D 2 (0; 1
2).
Without loss of generality let me also assume that ￿R = ￿D ￿ ￿ and ￿R = ￿D ￿ ￿. Groups can be
viewed as: majority Republicans (MR), majority Democrats (MD), minority (liberal) Republicans
(mR) and minority (conservative) Democrats (mD). Each group g is characterized by a continuous
and concave utility function ug de￿ned over the policies that are in the platforms such that the
relevant policy space is the one individuals face during the campaign and at the time of elections.
The policy set is composed by the policies, x;y 2 f0;1g: At the elections at most two policies
can be raised due to time and money constraints faced by the candidates. The utility function of
individual i in group g is:
ui
g(i;j) = V i
g ￿ sg(SD;SR)(gi ￿ x)2 ￿ (1 ￿ sg(SD;SR))(gj ￿ y)2
6i.e. individuals want to minimize the weighted distance of the policy from their ideal point. The
weight sg() 2 [0;1] captures the importance of the issue x relative to issue y for group g, it is
endogenous and depends on SD;SR; i.e. candidates optimal strategies. Moreover V i
g is the utility
individual i in group g enjoys, casting his ballot in favor of his party￿ s candidate. Since in this
framework individuals can either vote for the candidate representing their party or abstain, V i
g can
be interpreted as the individual utility to vote. The parameter V i
g measures an idiosyncratic bias
in group g for supporting their candidate or, in other words for political participation. I assume
that V i








; where a positive value of V i
g
denotes a bias in favor of going to vote.
The ideal policies of the four players are: (MRx;MRy) = (0;0); (mRx;mRy) = (0;1); (mDx;mDy) =
(1;0); (MDx;MDy) = (1;1); such that groups￿utility functions are:
1) uMR(x;y) = VMR ￿ sMRx2 ￿ (1 ￿ sMR)y2
2) umR(x;y) = VmR ￿ smRx2 ￿ (1 ￿ smR)(1 ￿ y)2
3) umD(x;y) = VmD ￿ smD(1 ￿ x)2 ￿ (1 ￿ smD)y2
4) uMD(x;y) = VMD ￿ sMD(1 ￿ x)2 ￿ (1 ￿ sMD)(1 ￿ y)2
Issues (x;y) can be interpreted as redistribution and religion respectively, where the position 0 in
the policy space stands for "against to", while 1 stands for "in favor of". Notice that in this example,
religion (y) is the divisive issue since it induces disagreement both within Republicans and within
Democrats, while (x) is the cohesive issue since disagreement takes place only between parties.
The groups mR and mD; represent the moderate component of the Republican and Democratic
constituency, and they can be identi￿ed with liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats. Let
D and R denote the Democratic and the Republican candidate, they belong to MR and MD , i.e.
the majority groups within each constituency. Parties adopt plurality rule to decide which policy
to select. Let ￿ > ￿, such that MR and MD represent the majority in their parties. Then the
platforms o⁄ered by the two candidates are (0;0)R and (1;1)D respectively. At the election, voters
in both coalitions have to decide whether to cast their ballot and support their candidate or to
abstain. In this framework candidates compete for turnout rates; on one hand, they try to get out
the votes of the individuals in their coalition, on the other hand, to increase the abstention among
the opponent coalition. Voter i in group g will decide to vote for his candidate when:
V i
g ￿ ￿ ￿ ug(x;y)g
7The parameter ￿ measures an idiosyncratic shock to the popularity of the Democratic candidate,
the plus in the expression applies to a leaning Democratic voter, while the minus is for a leaning









. This shock might be due to
an exogenous increase in the salience of an issue a coalition has a better reputation for handling, or
a scandal involving one of the candidate. From now on let me consider the voting behavior of the
Democratic coalition. By symmetry, the results apply to the Republican coalition. Substituting
with the expressions for the utility functions and the platforms, we ￿nd that voter i in group MD
will vote for his candidate whenever:
V i
MD + ￿ ￿ 0
while voter i in group mD votes for his candidate if:
V i
mD + ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ b s(SD;SR)mD
where b s() indicates the relative importance conservative Democrats assign to redistribution relative
to religion, or in other words, the relative saliency of the cohesive issue for voters in mD. Expression
(2) says that the more salient is the redistribution issue for the conservative Democrats, the higher
their turnout rates, so the Democratic candidate￿ s vote share. The opposite holds if the saliency of
religion is higher relative to redistribution.
2.2 Candidates Behavior
In this setup the relative saliency of an issue is endogenous and it depends on the amount of
campaign messages received by voters; as a consequence, each candidate has to decide the optimal
amount of resources to spend in advertising religion and redistribution, respectively. I will refer to
the ￿rst type of expenditure as divisive strategy and to the second as cohesive strategy. I assume
that candidate j (j = D;R) has a total amount of resources available for campaign equal to ￿jE,
with ￿j 2 [0;1], such that unless ￿D = ￿R, one of the candidates can spend more resources; this
intends to capture a di⁄erent ability of the candidates to raise money for campaigning. Let cj
denote the money spent by candidate j in the cohesive strategy and, let dj denote the resources
spent in the divisive strategy. Then the expression for b s, the salience every voter assigns to the




+ b sR + b sD
8where 1
2 represents the initial salience assigned to ￿rst issue by voters, while b sR and b sD are the
e⁄ects on issue salience due to the amount of cohesive advertising by Republican and Democratic
candidate respectively.





+ cj ￿ dj + (c￿j ￿ d￿j)
The salience of the ￿rts issue (redistribution) in the electorate is positively a⁄ected by the cohesive
advertising and negatively a⁄ected by the divisive advertising made by candidates. Candidates face
a clear trade o⁄; when they invest resources on advertising the cohesive (divisive) issue, they energize
(disa⁄ect) their constituency but also the opponent one. For instance, if the Democratic candidate
primes religion, this leads to defections among liberal Republicans but also among conservative
Democrats since both of these groups disagree on religion with their candidate. On the other hand,
if the Democratic candidate primes redistribution, this leads more voters of both groups to turn
out and support their candidate.
2.3 Equilibrium
The timing of the electoral game is the following: (i) The two candidates, simultaneously and
non-cooperatively, decide how much resources to spend in cohesive and divisive strategy. At this
stage, they know voters policy preferences. They also know the distributions for V i
g and ￿; but not
yet their realized values. (ii) The actual value of ￿ is realized and all uncertainty is resolved, (iii)
elections are held, the candidate obtaining the majority of the votes wins. Notice that candidates￿
decision is about the type of message to prime to a certain group and not the degree of moderation
of the two policies in the platform. The ￿swing voter￿in group MD is a voter who is indi⁄erent
between going to vote for his candidate and abstain, i.e.:
V i
MD + ￿ = 0
while the swing voter in group mD is de￿ned as:
V i
mD + ￿ = 1 ￿ b s
9Given the distributional assumption on V i
g, we can determine total turnout within the Democratic
coalition, which corresponds to the total number of votes received by candidate D. The turnout









+ ￿’mD + ’mD (cD ￿ dD + (cR ￿ dR))
By symmetry, one can obtain total turnout in favor of the Republican candidate in group MR and
mR respectively.
The probability of winning for Democratic candidate is de￿ned as:
PD ￿ Pr(￿TmD + ￿TMD ￿ (￿TmR + ￿TMR)) 1 0









s:t: ￿DE 1 cD + dD
and cD;dD 1 0;cD 0 c;dD ￿ d
In choosing cD and dD, the candidate faces a cost of campaigning which is assumed to be an
increasing convex function of the total amount of resources spent in c and d respectively. Moreover
her decision is subject to a budget constraint which depends on her ability ￿D; to raise campaign
funds. Notice that the scope for di⁄erential priming arises only for the minority groups, mD
and mR. Voters in these groups might decide to abstain, not supporting their candidate if the
salience of the issue on which they disagree increases. On the contrary, electoral participation
of the majority groups MD and MR, is only a⁄ected by exogenous events and does not depend
on political messages received. After substituting with the expressions for turnout rates, given the




















￿(’MD + ’MR) + ￿(’mD + ’mR￿
can be de￿ned as the average disposition toward elec-
toral participation in the population or equivalently the average responsiveness of the electorate.
The left hand side of the above expression is the marginal cost of "divisive" and "cohesive" adver-
tising, while the right hand side is the marginal bene￿t, in terms of probability of winning. The


















Let ￿ ￿ (’mD ￿ ’mR): Then equilibrium strategies depend on the total amount of resources
available to candidates and on ￿, i.e. the di⁄erence of groups responsiveness, since both candidates
try to make an electoral gain by the most responsive group. This is very intuitive; for instance,
if conservative Democrats are the less ideologized group, the Democratic candidate will spend
relatively more money to advertise redistribution, while the Republican candidate will do exactly the
opposite, priming relatively more religion. In other words, the di⁄erence between each candidate￿ s
equilibrium strategies is increasing in ￿. Indeed if groups are characterized by the same level of
partisanship, candidates end up spending an equal share of the budget in the cohesive and divisive
strategy. Interestingly, we can derive the total amount of money spent during the campaign in
advertising the divisive and the cohesive issue, respectively. This gives an idea of the degree of
equilibrium "cohesiveness" and "divisiveness" which characterizes a political campaign. Using the
equilibrium conditions we ￿nd:








11Notice that Div￿ = Coh￿, and the expressions only depend on the campaign funds available to
each candidate while no role is played by ￿. Since candidates can substitute cohesive and divisive
advertising in the same way, their optimal choices are symmetric with respect to the di⁄erence in
groups￿responsiveness ￿, and perfectly o⁄set each other, as it is evident from above. One can let
the parameter ￿ vary within a country; this might help to better understand the di⁄erent strategies
played by the candidates in di⁄erent states or regions during the campaign. Moreover one can let ￿
vary with TV programs; for instance if there are programs followed by a su¢ ciently heterogeneous
audience (in terms of ideology) but mostly watched by highly partisan conservative Democrats,
we might expect a Republican candidate to advertise more cohesive issues, as redistribution, and
the Democrat to do the opposite, in order to a⁄ect the decision to vote of the more responsive
liberal Republicans. This would allow to study the di⁄erence in candidates advertising strategies
across channels. Assuming conservative Democrats being more responsive than liberal Republicans,
especially in the South, this analysis would support the campaign strategies of Bush and Kerry in
2004 US Presidential race, where the former mainly played divisive, priming moral issues, while
the latter cohesive, priming health care and education.
2.4 Turnout
This simple model provides interesting implications for total turnout rate and for turnout rates
of di⁄erent groups. Taking into account candidates equilibrium strategies and the distributional






This expression tells us that total turnout rate is a decreasing function of the size and respon-
siveness of the con￿ icted groups; in each group the higher the partisanship of the voters, the higher
the probability they will support anyway their candidate (turning out), regardless the disagreement
experienced on the divisive issue. On the other hand, the higher the fraction of the responsive indi-
viduals within these groups, the more the disagreement on the second issue will a⁄ect their voting
decision and so a larger fraction of them will defect, not turning out.
12Now we analyze under which condition one of the two con￿ icted groups turns out more. It is





















where ’ ￿ (’mD +’mR), i.e. it is the total fraction of responsive voters in the con￿ icted groups
(or the average degree of responsiveness across groups). Notice this probability is decreasing in the
degree of responsiveness of the Democrats relative to the Republicans. Hence we can establish the
following result:
Proposition 1 In equilibrium the con￿icted group with a higher fraction of partisans will be more
likely to turn out than the group with a larger number of responsive individuals.
In this section notice that candidates strategies completely o⁄set each other and in equilibrium
turnout decisions only depend on the di⁄erence between groups responsiveness.
3 The Case of Issue Ownership
In this section I extend the model using the concept of issue ownership which has been studied
extensively in the political science literature since Petrocik (AJPS, 1996). According to this the-
ory, a candidate "owns" a certain issue if the electorate believes she is better able to handle the
problem than her opponent. A typical example is that Democratic candidates usually enjoy a bet-
ter reputation to deal with unemployment, jobs and social security, while Republican candidates
have a better reputation in dealing with national security, foreign policy and taxes. I introduce
this concept through a slight modi￿cation of candidates budget constraint; essentially I allow each
candidate to be able to spend campaign funds more e¢ ciently to advertise one issue relative to the
other; for instance, the Democratic candidate might use more e⁄ectively the money to campaign
redistribution relative to moral issues. All the previous assumptions still hold except for the budget
constraint that now becomes:
E 1 cj +
dj
￿j
; with j = D;R and ￿j > 0
Notice that parameter ￿j identi￿es the issue that candidate j is more e⁄ective to campaign; if
￿j < 1, the candidate is more able to spend for the cohesive issue, while if ￿j > 1 the opposite is
13true. In other words, if ￿j > 1, a dollar spent to advertise redistribution is equal to ￿j dollars spent
to advertise religion, or equivalently an ads on cohesive issue is equal to ￿j ads on religion.
In this scenario, candidates solve exactly the same problem as before but subject to the new

















As before, candidates strategies depend on total amount of resources available, on ￿, i.e. the
di⁄erence of groups responsiveness, but now also on ￿j, i.e. the e⁄ectiveness (in terms of money
spent) a candidate can campaign for the divisive issue relative to the cohesive issue. Notice that,
ceteris paribus, a higher ￿j allows the candidate to spend less money on the divisive strategy, since
she can obtain the same electoral e⁄ect with fewer (but e⁄ective) divisive ads.
It is interesting to analyze how the equilibrium level of campaign "cohesiveness" and "divisive-
ness" change under this scenario. Using the new equilibrium conditions, we ￿nd:





















Notice that now the total amount of divisive messages depends also on the relative responsive-
ness of the con￿ icted groups and on the relative ability of candidates to campaign for the divisive
issues. We can generalize this result as the following:
Proposition 2 If ￿R > ￿D, the equilibrium "divisiveness" of the campaign is an increasing function
of ￿, while if ￿D > ￿R, the equilibrium "divisiveness" of the campaign is a decreasing function of
￿.
Assuming that Republican candidate is more e⁄ective in campaigning the divisive issue than
the Democratic candidate, then the level of campaign divisiveness will be higher the less partisan
are the conservative Democrats relative to the liberal Republicans. This result is very intuitive;
assume a relative increase in the responsiveness of the conservative Democrats, such that this group
14will ensure a relatively higher electoral gain. As a consequence, both candidates will attempt to
in￿ uence its members￿voting decision; on one hand, the Republican candidate will try to let them
stay home in the election day and so she has the incentive to spend more in advertising the divisive
issue, on the other hand, the Democratic candidate will try to make them turn out and so she has
the incentive to spend relatively less in the divisive strategy and more in the cohesive strategy.
However, while the Republican candidate can spend ￿R dollars more in advertising religion, taking
away one dollar from the ads on redistribution, the Democratic candidate needs to take away
￿D dollars from the divisive strategy to be able to increase only by one dollar her spending in
the cohesive strategy. Since ￿R > ￿D; this implies a net increase in the total amount of divisive
advertising, while the amount of cohesive advertising remains una⁄ected.
3.1 Turnout
As before, we derive the expected value of total turnout in the population and turnout rate of each



















Notice that, as long as ’mj > ’m￿j and ￿￿j > ￿j; the expected turnout rate in the population is
lower than in the benchmark case. This result directly derives from proposition (2); when campaign
divisiveness increases a higher fraction of voters becomes disa⁄ected and decides to not support its
candidate, staying home in the election day. As a consequence, equilibrium turnout rate declines.


























Notice that there is an additional term compare to the probability in (6) which again depends
on the di⁄erence between candidates￿e⁄ectiveness in campaigning di⁄erent issues. The next propo-
sition follows:
Proposition 3 The con￿icted group with a higher fraction of partisans will be more likely to turn
out than the group with a larger number of responsive individuals, if the candidate of the former is
15more e⁄ective in advertising the divisive issue. The opposite will hold if the candidate of the most
responsive group is better in "divisive" campaigning.
3.1.1 Comments
The important di⁄erence between proposition (2) and proposition (3) is that the e⁄ect described
now depends crucially on the sign and the magnituide of ￿￿ ￿ (￿R￿￿D): Indeed if candidates do not
di⁄er in their relative ability in spending in divisive advertising (i.e. ￿￿ = 0 ), as established in the
previous section, the most partisan group will always turn out more then the other. Here we point
out that the e⁄ect might be the opposite whenever ￿￿ 6= 0. As already said, the more responsive
group, is the relevant one, in terms of electoral gain, for candidates strategies; as a consequence,
if a candidate enjoys an advantage in advertising a certain issue, she will be able to a⁄ect more
its members voting decision, obtaining a net electoral gain. Assume as before that Republican
candidate is more e¢ cient in campaigning for moral issues than the Democratic candidate, and
conservative Democrats becomes more responsive to these issues than liberal Republicans. Under
this scenario, the Republican candidate would invest relatively more on divisive campaign, while
the Democratic candidate would like to do the opposite, investing relatively more money in cohesive
advertising (to get out the vote of con￿ icted Democrats). However, the Republican candidate can
increase the divisive advertising by ￿R dollars, taking away one dollar from cohesive advertising,
while the Democratic candidate can increase the ads on redistribution by one dollar taking away
￿D dollars from ads on religion. The net e⁄ect will be a higher degree of disa⁄ection and so a lower
turnout among the most responsive group, namely conservative Democrats.
4 Information Asymmetry
Untill now we have assumed that candidates do not have the possibility to campaign an issue
only for a group of voters, in other words we ruled out any information asymmetry among groups.
We know that in the real world this is not always the case and actually informational barriers
between voters can arise for several reasons; a fractionalized society where information does not
easily spread among di⁄erent language groups, a segmented market where ideologically homogenous
voters consume the same media, or the availability of communication technologies which allow
politician to target di⁄erent messages at the individual level, as emails, door to door visits, sms,
etc. Moreover politicians know very well the preferences of the electorate, on consumption, politics,
16religion, leisure, and so on, therefore they are able to perfectly identify groups of con￿ icted partisans.
In this section I will show that the availability of new types of media, raising informational barriers
among voters, increases the scope for a strategic use of issues by candidates. The crucial assumption
here is that voters can hear only some campaign messages and not others; in particular, when
a candidate targets the con￿ icted partisans of the opponent coalition with a divisive issue, the
con￿ icted partisans of her coalition do not hear the message. As a consequence, the relative salience
of divisive issue will increase more for the opponent￿ s than for her own￿ s con￿ icted supporters. Hence
only the former will be disa⁄ected by the divisive campaign. In other words, the salience becomes
group speci￿c and the trade o⁄ faced by politicians in choosing their advertising strategy becomes
less severe. Considering the benchmark case, lets assume that the expression for b s, the salience
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where the parameter ￿ captures exactly the degree of informational asymmetry among voters,
indicating the extent to which messages targeted to one group spread (and are known) to the
other. The analysis which follows is a generalization of the benchmark case, which can be obtained
assuming ￿ = 1, i.e. absence of any information asymmetry. A lower value of ￿ indicates higher
barriers, which in turn implies that candidates face a less severe trade o⁄. It is easy to show that
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￿
Notice that the presence of parameter ￿ plays an important role for equilibrium strategies;
consider the case in which (’mj ￿ ’m￿j) > 0 , then candidate j has the incentive to obtain a net
electoral gain among the con￿ icted partisans of her party. As we have seen before, the way to do
that is to invest more in cohesive than divisive advertising. As the informational barriers among
voters increase (lower ￿), divisive campaigning becomes relatively more "pro￿table" for candidate
j, therefore she will decrease cohesive advertising. The opposite is true if informational barriers
are lower (higher ￿), so that cohesive advertising becomes relatively more attractive for candidate
17j. Notice that as information asymmetry increases, candidates have a lower incentive to substitute
between strategies since political competition decreases. As a consequence, the di⁄erence between
optimal investment in cohesive and divisive ads shrinks.
Let us show how the equilibrium level of campaign "cohesiveness" and "divisiveness" change
when information asimmetry among voters arises. Using previous conditions, we ￿nd:








The total amount of divisive advertising is equal to the cohesive one and it is the same as in
the baseline model. Since candidates can substitute cohesive and divisive advertising in the same
way, their optimal choices are symmetric with respect to the di⁄erence in groups￿responsiveness
￿, and perfectly o⁄set each other, as it is evident from (12).
4.1 Turnout
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Notice that similarly to (10), if ￿ > 0; the expected turnout is lower than in the benchmark
case whenever ￿D < ￿R. In order to provide the intuition on the role played by ￿, we determine







Let ￿ > 0; the next proposition follows:
Proposition 4 Whenever ￿R > ￿D, then
@E(TT000)
@￿
> 0, i.e. a marginal increase in ￿ determines
an increase in the total expected turnout. If instead, ￿R < ￿D, then
@E(TT000)
@￿
< 0 , i.e. a marginal
increase in ￿ determines a decrease in total expected turnout.
This result is very intuitive; an increase in ￿ (lower information asymmetry) implies that, cohe-
sive advertising by the Republican candidate induces a higher number of conservative Democrats to
18support their candidate and, as a consequence to turn out. On the other hand, lower informational
barriers imply also that divisive advertising by the Democratic candidate disa⁄ects a higher fraction
of conservative Democrats, leading them to not turn out. Obviously the ￿rst e⁄ect tend to increase
total turnout, while the second decreases it. The net e⁄ect depends on which of the candidate can
spend more money in the campaign and so deliver more ads; if more resources are available to the
Republican candidate, the ￿rst e⁄ect would dominate and total turnout would increase. Now the
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(16)
This expression di⁄ers from (5) for the last term in square brackets. The ￿rst component cap-
tures the direct e⁄ect of total expenditure in advertising on the con￿ icted Democrats, while the
second captures the indirect e⁄ect of advertising. The term "direct" captures the e⁄ect of ads which
intend to target a speci￿c group (through sms, mails, etc. ) while the "indirect" e⁄ect describes
the e⁄ect of ads which reach a group thanks to a positive ￿ (eg. word of mouth). Considering the
direct e⁄ect of advertising (￿rst component), whenever ￿R > ￿D; conservative Democrats will be
less likely to turn out than liberal Republicans, since they receive more divisive than cohesive mes-
sages. Instead, considering the indirect e⁄ect of campaign (second component), whenever ￿R > ￿D;
conservative Democrats will be more likely to turn out than liberal Republicans, since they are
reached by a larger number of cohesive messages delivered by the richer Republican candidate,
than divisive ads by the Democratic candidate. Which one of these e⁄ects will dominate depends
on the size of informational barriers. Let ￿ > 0 such that conservative Democrats is the most
responsive group, then we can generalize the result in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Ceteris paribus, con￿icted Republicans will be more likely to turn out, if their can-
didate has a larger budget available for campaign (i.e. ￿R > ￿D). If instead (￿D ￿ ￿R) >
￿
’E(1 ￿ ￿)
the opposite will hold.
Proposition tells us that the most responsive group will turn out more if its candidate has more
campaign funds to spend than the opponent and the informational barriers are high enough.
4.2 Comments
Previous results might be seen from di⁄erent points of view, depending on the interpretation of
parameter ￿. We propose two main interpretations for ￿:
191) As a measure of the "targeting capacity" of di⁄erent types of media available to candidates;
while direct emails, door to door campaigns, mobile text messages, personal visits can be considered
having a low ￿, since they allow to customize messages at the individual level, a speech at a party
convention and billboards are characterized by a high ￿;
2) As a measure of the degree of ideological clustering of di⁄erent media, where media with
homogenous audiances in terms of ideology, are characterized by lower values of ￿, while media
with a more heterogeneous audiance are characterized by a higher ￿.
Using the ￿rst interpretation my analysis determines which type of issues a candidate would
prime in direct emails compare to convention speeches. According to this, we would expect a
candidate to mainly focus either in cohesive or divisive advertising (in order to gain among the most
responsive group) when using high-￿ type of media as convention speeches, streets ads, etc. Instead
we would expect a candidate￿ s strategies to be more similar when using low-￿ type of media as text
messages, email and personal visits; through these tools candidates can prime di⁄erent issues to
each of the disagreement groups, therefore they need to substitute less between cohesive and divisive
advertising. Indeed, as already mentioned, there is evidence in 2004 presidential campaign, about
an extensive use of emails and text messages precisely for priming speci￿c issues such as abortion,
minimum wage or social security to speci￿c groups of voters. Using the second interpretation, one
can study the link between candidates strategies and the level of ideological homogeneity of the
audiances of di⁄erent TV programs. According to this interpretation, the Rush Limbaugh￿ s radio
Shows and the O￿Reilly Factor, having a conservative homogenous audiance, can be considered
as low- ￿ type of programs, compare to CNN and NPR that have a more heterogenous audiance.
Hence, we can reformulate the results as the following: when using CNN, both candidates mainly
invest in advertising the issue which let them gain among the most responsive disagreement group.
On the contrary, when they give an interview or deliver an ad during the Rush Limbaugh￿ s Shows
or Larry King Live, they have the incentive to raise speci￿c issues, cohesive or divisive, depending
on the ideological leaning of these programs￿audiance.
5 Descriptive Evidence
In this section we present descriptive evidence supporting some predictions of the model. We use
the data by Wisconsin Advertising Project. These data have detailed informations on each single
advertisement broadcasted on television during the entire electoral period; channel, tone of the ad,
20content, estimated cost, etc. Moreover we consider state level turnout rates in 2000 and 2004 by the
US Census Bureau. Given the data available, this exercise does not pretend to establish any causal
relation but just provide descriptive and suggestive evidence. First of all, issues are de￿ned cohesive
or divisive depending on the distribution of voters preferences within and across parties. According
to the 2004 Blair Center Survey (Hylligus and Shields, 2009), around 20% of partisans volunteer a
policy disagreement with their party on cultural issues, while only 13% on economic issues; more in
detail, around 15% of partisans disagree with their party on moral issues, 10% on gun control policy,
while only 5% and 4% of partisans disagree with their party on employment issues and education
policy, respectively. Moreover the partisans who experience a disagreement with their party on
those issues, were the liberal Republicans on one side and the conservative Democrats on the other.
In our analysis we de￿ne education policy and employment as cohesive issues, while moral issues and
gun control policy are considered divisive issues. Looking at the distribution of political preferences
across US regions, we found that compare to other regions, the West is characterized by the highest
fraction of individuals who de￿ne themselves as liberal, while the South has the highest percentage
of individuals who de￿ne themselves as conservative. This is consistent with the fact that in US
the richest area are the most liberal compare to the poorest ones (Gelman, 2008). Indeed according
to a recent survey (Gallup Poll, 2009), the majority of liberal Republicans live in the West, while
the majority of conservative Democrats is concentrated in the South. Since we are con￿dent on
the distribution of individuals preferences in these two regions we focus on candidates strategy in
the West and in the South. This exercise can be intended also as comparing more conservative
(relatively poor) to more liberal (relatively rich) areas. The analysis applies to the the last ￿ve
months of the campaign, from June to November 2004. We de￿ne as divisive strategy the share
of money a candidate spends on advertising moral issues and gun control policy, while we de￿ne
as cohesive strategy the share of money spent on advertising education policy and labour issues.
There is evidence (Gallup poll, 2004) that Kerry was perceived better on economic issues while
Bush on terrorism and generally was seen better as a moral leader. As a consequence, we assume
that Bush "owned" the divisive issues, while Kerry the cohesive issues, in other words, using the
notation in the third section, ￿R > ￿D. Under this scenario, we expect to ￿nd supporting evidence
for the following statements: 1) in regions with a higher fraction of liberal Republicans, Kerry
would advertise relatively more divisive issues, while Bush would do the opposite; 2) divisiveness
of campaign is higher in regions where the candidate of the smaller con￿ icted group is more able in
divisive advertising and, 3) in regions where campaign divisiveness is higher, turnout rate is lower.
21Let me mention that in the model we considered groups responsiveness, while here we take into
account the size of disagreement groups; ￿rst, the main results of the model could be restated in
terms of groups size, since as responsiveness, it renders a group more appealing for candidates.
Additionally, it is not easy to measure groups responsiveness (even though there is some evidence
on the lower degree of partisanship of conservative Democrats, see People of the Press 2004), so we
prefer to use the size to measure how a group is relevant in terms of political competition. Although
we are aware that television advertising does not represent the full picture, 76% of respondents in
a survey conducted after 2004 elections (People of the Press, 2004) named television as the main
source of campaign information. For these reasons we are con￿dent that the following evidence
supports the implications of the model. In the graph below we show that in the West, where
the liberal Republicans are the relevant con￿ icted group, Kerry spent relatively more money in
advertising gun control policy and moral issues than in the South where conservative Democrats
are the relevant group, while Bush did exactly the opposite.
If we analyze other single issues, the scenario remains the same. In the graphs below we
report the share of money candidates spent in divisive issues such as energy or foreign policy and
cohesive issues such as health care. Overall the evidence supports the ￿rst statement, i.e. candidates
equilibrium behavior as described in the model.
2223The graph below supports the second statement showing that the total share of divisive adver-
tising is higher where Bush, perceived as better in divisive issues, is the candidate of the minor
con￿ icted group; this is actually the case in the South where conservative Democrats represent the
relevant disagreement group.
To e⁄ectively test the third statement, i.e. the e⁄ect of candidates equilibrium strategies on
turnout, we would need data on individual exposure to avertising and voting intention before and
24after elections. Given the data available we present a general pattern, however further analysis is
required to establish a causal relation between the variables of interest. The table below reports
for each region, turnout rates in 2000 and 2004 and their variation.
Region Turnout 2004 Turnout 2000 Delta Turnout
South 62.24 58.23 0.06
West 63.72 55.94 0.13
In the following graph notice that the variation in turnout rate is negatively correlated to the
total share of divisive advertising.
In our model divisive messages disa⁄ect disagreement groups, inducing them to stay home in
the election day. Moreover divisive messages are more e⁄ective if sent by the candidate who "owns"
them, as Bush did during 2004 campaign. Since Bush invested in divisive advertising especially in
the South, we argue that the lower turnout in the region is perfectly consistent with our model;
in particular this can be explained, at least in part, by low turnout rates among conservative
Democrats, the largest con￿ icted group in the South.
6 Conclusions
This paper studies how under some circumstances, political competition leads candidates to strate-
gically increase the salience of speci￿c issues in order to in￿ uence voting decisions of marginal
25groups and to win exploiting an intensive margin, with non trivial consequences for turnout rates.
In this framework issues di⁄er in their divisiveness, to be de￿ned as the extent to which members
within a coalition disagree. Given the high level of diversity in our societies, we expect wedge
issues such as religion, moral values or the environment to become more and more relevant. In
the presence of disagreement within coalitions, political candidates face a trade-o⁄; they can either
choose cohesive issues which energize their own (but also their opponent) constituency or divisive
issues which disa⁄ect the opponent (but also their own) supporters. Typically the ￿rst type of
issues energizes voters and increases turnout, while the second type of issues increases disa⁄ection
of voters, who tend to stay home in the election day. Using a probabilistic model of electoral com-
petition, we derive the conditions under which, perfect competition between politicians generates
in equilibrium asymmetric behavior, i.e. di⁄erent turnout rates for di⁄erent groups of voters. The
results are relevant for the literature on political participation and turnout, pointing out that it is
crucial to analyze campaign e⁄ects on di⁄erent groups of voters, to explain turnout rates actually
observed. First we show that, as the di⁄erence in groups responsiveness increases, candidates have
a higher incentive to substitute between strategies and as a consequence, each candidate ends up
investing mainly in one type of advertising. This e⁄ect is lower in the presence of high informa-
tional asymmetries among voters, which actually decrease political competition and so the scope
for substitution between strategies. Second, assuming that one candidate is better able in divisive
advertising and she is the candidate of the most partisan group, we ￿nd that divisiveness of cam-
paign increases and total turnout decreases. Moreover the most responsive group is generally less
likely to turnout. The opposite holds if: a) its candidate is more able in divisive advertising or,
b) if its candidate has more money for campaigning and informational barriers are high enough.
Interestingly, this analysis provides insights on the role played by new techonologies in in￿ uencing
equilibrium outcomes, allowing politicians to target campaign messages to particular population
subgroups. We also show that these results are consistent with descriptive evidence on 2004 US
Presidential campaign. The analysis provides several political implications for environments, such
as heterogeneous societies, where the scope for priming is higher; ￿rst, we have seen that it can
lead to a decrease in political participation of the most responsive voters, which in turn would
imply a higher political representation of partisans in the following legislature, with non trivial
consequences. Second, since priming is directed toward minority disagreement groups, it might
cause a decrease in the overall welfare. Indeed voters in majority groups might su⁄er a utility loss
if the issue they more care about, is disregarded by their candidate (this might translate in a utility
26loss at the time of elections or during the legislature). Finally in the presence of informational
barriers, priming diverse matters to di⁄erent groups might lead to unstable governments, not able
to implement a fragmented platform; in general, at least a fraction of the voters will see the issue
perceived during the campaign, as the most important, completely disregarded by the appointed
candidate during the legislature and this might lead to remarkable political tensions. The theory
could be empirically tested using individual data on voting intentions before and after elections,
as well as individual exposure to di⁄erent sources of advertising. Finally let me mention that we
focus on turnout decision, but the analysis might as well, be applied to undecideds between the
candidates, i.e. swing voters.
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